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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ANGIE BRAKE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010204-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted possession of a controlled substance,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), in
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Lynn W. Davis, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the investigating officer's opening
the door of defendant's car without a warrant was reasonably justified by a concern for his
personal safety.
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue. Underlying fact findings are
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of law,

however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" as regards the
application of legal standards to the facts. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative constitutional provision is determinative of this case:
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Angie Brake, was charged with possession or use of cocaine, a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1999) (Count I), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1998) (Count II) (R. 8). Following a preliminary
hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on both charges (R. 19-20). Defendant moved
to suppress the investigating officer's discovery of contraband and defendant's statements
allegedly received in violation of Miranda (R. 29-40).l The trial court denied the motion with
respect to the discovery of the contraband and granted the motion with respect to the alleged
Miranda violation (R. 57-64). Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a
controlled substance, conditioning her plea on the right to appeal the trial court's partial denial

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
2

of her motion to suppress. The trial court dismissed Count II, charging possession of
paraphernalia (R. 76-83). The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory one-year term,
but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 86-88). Defendant timely
appealed (R. 95).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
At approximately 11:45 p.m. on January 29, 2000, Utah County Deputy Sheriff Neil
Castleberry was patrolling in Pleasant Grove, west of the Geneva Steel plant, when he noticed
a small green Nissan car and a white Chevrolet pickup truck pulled off the road in a small
pullout(R. 102:6,8-9 14-15,33). It was dark outside and cold (R. 102:8,31). Without turning
on his emergency lights, he pulled in behind them and stopped his car to inquire whether
anyone needed assistance (R. 102:15). He first approached the Nissan and asked the driver
to roll down her window. She complied. In response to the deputy's questions, the driver,
a young woman, admitted she was only fifteen years old and that she did not have a driver's
license (R. 102:15-16,31). The driver also claimed that she had not been driving (R. 102:31).
In answer to the deputy's request about who owned the car, the driver said the owner was in
the back seat (R. 102:16). He tried to look into the interior, but the windows were fogged and
it was difficult to see, although he could make out a male and a female (R. 102:16, 31-32).

2

The facts are recited "in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings."
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997) (reviewing denial of motion to
suppress). The facts are taken from testimony given at the preliminary hearing, over
which the trial judge presided and upon which the trial court's ruling is based (R. 64,
102).
3

Deputy Castleberry stepped to the driver's side rear door, but because that window
was also fogged he opened the door to speak with the owner (R. 120:16,32). He spoke with
a defendant, attempting to identify the owner of the car and why there was a fifteen-year-old
sitting in the driver's seat after curfew, 11:30 p.m. (R. 102:17, 37). Defendant identified
herself as the owner of the Nissan (R: 102:17). Defendant also claimed that she and her
friends were all from Sanpete County, that she had driven to their location quite some time
earlier, and that afterward the fifteen-year-old and she had changed seats (R. 102:17, 33).
Defendant also told the deputy that her identification was in her purse, pointing to the front
seat(R. 102:17,33,38).
Deputy Castleberry testified that he was concerned for his safety at this point (R.
102:18). He explained that he was a lone officer in an isolated area known for frequent
criminal activity, late at night, with five people to deal with, at least one of whom was a
fifteen-year-old juvenile. He also had to deal with the occupants of two different vehicles,
three in the Nissan and two in the pickup, neither of whom he had yet seen (R. 102:18,33-34,
43-44). With his safety in mind, he walked around the rear of the Nissan and opened the
front passenger door to retrieve the purse so that he could hand it to defendant, making sure
that there were not any weapons in or around the purse (R. 102:17-18, 35). Deputy
Castleberry saw a purse on the front passenger seat (R. 102:18, 36).3 Deputy Castleberry

3

In fact, as noted below, Deputy Castleberry actually picked up the purse of
another member of defendant's group when he saw the bindle. Somewhat later, he found
defendant's purse, which was also around the front seat (R. 102:38-39).
4

specifically stated that he did not want anyone else reaching into the area of the purse without
his control (R. 102:18). As he reached for the purse he noticed a small white bindle
containing a white powdery substance on the seat next to the purse, near the car's console (R.
102:18-19). The bindle was in plain view, readily seen even without moving the purse (R. 1920, 36).

From his experience and training in drug recognition, Deputy Castleberry

immediately suspected that the bindle contained a controlled substance (R. 102:36-37).
When Deputy Castleberry picked up the purse and asked about its owner, someone said
that it belonged to "Lilly" (R. 102:43). When he asked where Lilly was, he was directed to
the pickup truck (R. 102:43). Deputy Castleberry carried the purse and the bindle to the truck,
opened the door, and asked for Lilly and whether the purse belonged to her (R. 102:43). Lilly
acknowledged the purse was hers, but denied any knowledge of the cocaine. Deputy
Castleberry then escorted her to his patrol car where he interviewed her and tested the bindle
(R. 102:43, 45). The bindle tested positive for cocaine (R. 102:19-20, 43). Deputy
Castleberry returned to the Nissan and asked all three occupants of the Nissan who owned the
cocaine (R. 102:20, 37). He received no response from anyone, including defendant (R.
102:20, 37). At some point in his investigation, Deputy Castleberry checked four of the five
individuals, including defendant, for signs of cocaine use and concluded that all four exhibited
signs of cocaine use (R. 102:45-46).
Although Deputy Castleberry acknowledged that defendant was not free to leave, he
did not consider defendant to be in custody at this point nor had he arrested her because he

5

had not yet determined "what was going on" - - he did not know who owned the cocaine.
Consequently, Deputy Castleberry had not yet given defendant her Mirandarights(R. 102:2021,42). Unable to determine who owned the cocaine after questioning defendant and another
occupant, the deputy informed defendant that because, as owner, she was responsible for what
was inside her car, he would arrest her if no one claimed ownership of the cocaine (R. 102:2021). Defendant then admitted that the cocaine belonged to her and that she and her
companions had been using the cocaine found in the Nissan throughout that evening (R.
102:21-22, 28, 47). Deputy Castleberry took defendant into custody. He did not give
defendant a Miranda warning, nor did he further question her (R. 102:22).
Shortly after Deputy Castleberry found the bindle he called for backup. Deputy Shawn
Chipman responded to the call and learnedfromDeputy Castleberry that he had found drugs
in the Nissan (R. 102:5-6,42). At Deputy Castleberry's direction, Deputy Chipman searched
the passenger compartment of the Nissan for additional evidence incident to an impending
arrest of either defendant or one of her party (R. 102:6, 42). On a ledge against the rear
window, also in plain view, he found a tin cannister containing some residue, a clear baggy,
a plastic straw, and a razor blade (R. 102:6-7, 11-13, 19,40-41). Deputy Chipman gave the
cannister and its contents to Deputy Castleberry (R. 102:12). Defendant admitted that the
container and its contents also belonged to her (R. 102:22, 27).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the investigating deputy's opening the door of
defendant's car without a warrant was reasonably justified by a concern for his safety. The
deputy approached defendant and her companions, on a dark night in an isolated, high crime
area. The deputy suddenly found himself alone in the midst of five individuals, strangers to
the area, in two vehicles. Considering the well-documented danger inherent in automobile
traffic stops, the deputy was reasonably concerned for his safety. Additionally, any intrusion
into defendant's car was minimal and reasonable because it was taken only for the legitimate
purpose of establishing defendant's identity.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
INVESTIGATING DEPUTY'S OPENING THE DOOR OF
DEFENDANT'S CAR WITHOUT A WARRANT WAS REASONABLY
JUSTIFIED BY A CONCERN FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY
Defendant does not challenge the propriety or legality of Deputy Castleberry's
approaching defendant and her companions to offer any possible assistance, nor does she
challenge his opening the rear passenger door to make contact with her, the owner of the
Nissan. Rather, defendant challenges only the deputy's opening the front passenger door to
secure her purse and to maintain control of the vehicle. Defendant claims the deputy's action
was an improper warrantless search, unjustified by reasonable concern for his safety. Aplt.
Br. at 7-11. However, the record supports the trial court's ruling that the deputy's action was
justifiable. Moreover, the intrusiveness of Deputy Castleberry's protective search was
7

substantially diminished by the fact that he opened the door only to safely provide defendant
access to her purse and the license within it, documentation all drivers are required to show
a police officer during a valid stop.
A. The trial court properly recognized that the circumstances
justified the deputy's reasonable concern for his safety.
When the safety of the police or the public is threatened, the Fourth Amendment
permits officers to conduct a warrantless search. State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah
App. 1992) (citing State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990)); see also State v.
Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah App. 1990), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)
(protecting police, public safety, and preventing destruction of evidence are exceptions to
warrant requirement); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,110,98 S. Ct. 330,333 (1977)
("Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in
the performance of their duties.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1181(1968)).
"[W]hen an officer reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may obtain
immediate control of weapons, a protective search is justified." Bradford, 866 P.2d at 870
(citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481(1983). "An officer
may conduct a protective weapons search only if '"a reasonably prudent [person] in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belier that his [or her] safety or that of others was
in danger.'"" Id. (quoting State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291,293 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883))). "'[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
8

must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with ration
inferences from those facts, justifiably warrant that intrusion."' New York v. Class, 475 U.S.
106, 116-17,106 S. Ct. 960,967 (1986) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80
(footnote omitted) (brackets as in Terry)).
In this case, the trial court made findings of fact, unchallenged on appeal, which recite
those facts testified to by Deputy Castlebeny, and which support the court's ruling that the
deputy was reasonably justified in opening the front passenger door of defendant's car {See
Ruling on Motion to Suppress, "Ruling," R. 57-64, attached at Addendum A). Those facts,
as set out by the court, are
1. [Deputy Castlebeny] was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup.
2. It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in
Utah County.
3. The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer [sic]
Castlebeny described it as a "deserted road."
4. There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each (three
occupants in the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup
truck which was parked contiguous).
5. This was an area of frequent criminal activity.
6. His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact
that all of the windows were fogged up.
7. The other vehicle was running and Officer Castlebeny testified he
believed the subject vehicle had the engine on with a fifteen-year-old
girl behind the wheel and two other passengers in the back seat.
(R. 60). From these facts the court reasoned that for safety purposes Deputy Castlebeny

would have been justified in shining a flashlight into the interior of the car (R. 60). However,
because the windows were fogged, the court implicitly reasoned that the deputy was justified
in opening the car door because he could not adequately see into it (R. 60).
The trial court's ruling should be upheld. Police are entitled to take reasonable
precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic investigation. State
v. O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647,649 (Utah App. 1998) (trooper's reasonable concern for his safety
precluded his asking defendant to retrieve registration and justified officer's looking through
vehicle window for weapons). Indeed, "[o]wing to inherent safety concerns and the limited
nature of the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle
during the course of the investigation." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 10,13 P.3d 576 (citing
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111, 98 S. Ct. at 333). Alternatively, with the same safety
considerations in mind, an officer may order an automobile passenger to remain in the vehicle,
as in this case. See State v. Mendez, 970 P.2d 722, 728 (Wash. 1999)(applying greater
protection under state constitution that afforded by Fourth Amendment). Moreover, "[i]t is
clear that the safety concerns guiding the Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend
on any particular showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique
circumstances of a given automobile stop, . . . but rather are of an inherent and general
nature." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Deputy Castleberry's objective safety concern was real and reasonable. The
United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the danger facing police during

10

traffic stops. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997), the
Supreme Court observed that '[i]n 1994 alone, there were 5,672 officer assaults and 11
officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." The Supreme Court has previously noted
that approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an officer approaches a suspect seated
in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n.13; see also United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218,234 n.5 (1973) (FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in
a three-month period were killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (3d. ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while
conducting field interrogations than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer
shootings that occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has been
made). Utah law enforcement is not immune from the national trend. See, e.g., State v.
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 ffl[2-5, 994 P.2d 177 (passenger in traffic stop shot at officer after
ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah
1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as officer approached vehicle).
In circumstances similar to those in this case, courts have found that an investigating
officer was justified in conducting a Terry "stop and frisk." In Commonwealth v. Almeida,
366 N.E. 2d 756 (Mass. 1977), the defendant was sitting alone in an automobile in a high
crime district late at night with the engine running and the headlights off. The vehicle was
parked in a private parking space, although the defendant stated he was not from that area and
offered no other explanation. The defendant stated he did not own the vehicle and produced

11

his operator's license on demand by lifting the cover of a console on the seat just high enough
to get his hand in and remove a wallet, but did not immediately produce the vehicle
registration on demand. At one point the defendant twisted to the right in the seat at a time
when the policeman could not observe his hands. At the time that the search took place, the
police had not yet learned whether the vehicle was stolen. On these facts, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court concluded that the investigating officer had a reasonable concern for his
safety, justifying his opening the defendant's car door and leaning into the interior, where he
happened to see the holster of a gun protruding beneath the driver's seat. Id. at 758,760. See
also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413, 117 S. Ct. at 885 (recognizing the passengers left in rear seat
and "fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources
of harm to the officer").
Further, this case is unlike State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), upon which
defendant relies, see Aplt. Br. at 10, in several important respects.4 In Schlosser, the officer
stopped a speeding car and immediately opened the passenger side door, based on his belief
that the passenger's fidgeting and turning signaled an attempt to hide something. Id. at 1134,

4

The continued vitality of Schlosser may also be undermined by the later holding
in Wilson. The Schlosser court rejected the State's contention that the movements of the
defendant, a passenger in the stopped car, justified a reasonable concern for officer
safety. Id. at 1137-38. However, the opinion was partly founded on the express
limitation in Mimms, that an officer was authorized to order only the driver from a
stopped car for safety concerns. Id. at 1135, 1135 n.3 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 n.5,
111 n.6, 98 S. Ct. at 333 n.5, 333 n.6). In Wilson, the United States Supreme Court held
that an officer may also order a passenger from a validly stopped car for safety reasons.
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
12

1134 n.l. The supreme court found the passenger's conduct insufficient to support a
reasonable belief that the officer's actions were motivated by a safety concern. Id. at 1138.
However, the officer admitted that his immediately asking the passenger for identification
was a pretense for trying to determine what the passenger might have been hiding, the officer
scanned the interior of the car to search for evidence of criminal activity rather than to secure
his safety, and the officer stated no safety concerns as a basis for his actions. Id. at 1134-37.
In contrast to the officer's actions in Schlosser, Deputy Castleberry first approached
defendant by opening the rear passenger door, for the legitimate purpose of speaking to her
as owner of the car (R. 102:16, 32). See James, 2000 UT 80 at f 13 (approving officer's
opening driver's door to investigate status of driver). Only when defendant could not readily
show her license did the deputy open the front passenger door (R. 102:17-18). There was no
evidence that the deputy was looking for evidence of criminal activity. Rather, Deputy
Castleberry explicitly stated that, under the circumstances, he opened the door to retrieve the
purse himself because he was concerned for his safety (R. 102:17-18, 33-35, 43-44).
Additionally, in response to the deputy's request to see her license, defendant pointed to her
purse, signaling her compliance with the deputy's request. See Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1136
n.4 (distinguishing State v. Perez, 435 A.2d 334, 338 (Conn. 1980), wherein the defendant
acquiesced in the officer's request by simultaneously opening the car door with the officer).
Finally, defendant argues that Deputy Castleberry's alleged concern for his safety was
unpersuasive since he failed to immediately call for backup, to order the occupants from their

13

vehicles and to frisk them, and because nothing about the underlying offense that suggested
a concern for safety. Aplt. Br. at 11. All of these arguments are answered by previously cited
authority. See 0 'Brien, 959 P.2d at (officer justifiably proceeded with investigation out of
concern for safety without calling for backup); Mendez, 970 P.2d at 728 (officer may order
an automobile passenger to remain in the vehicle for safety reasons); Almeida, 366 N.E.2d at
(circumstances surrounding routine traffic patrol stop justified search).
In sum, the trial court correctly recognized that the circumstances of the stop justified
Deputy Castleberry's concern for his safety and constituted a reasonable basis for his
warrantless opening of the front door of defendant's car. Ultimately, the trial court's ruling
here reflects an understanding that in determining the reasonableness of a given situation,
"'common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.'" State v.
Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
685 (1985)). Finding that Deputy Castleberry saw the bindle in plain view as soon as he
opened the door, the trial court correctly concluded that the contraband was admissible.5
B. Any intrusiveness resulting from the search was diminished by
the officer's right to demand that a driver show an operator's license.
"Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, persons

5

"A seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully
present, (2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating." State v.
Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, (Utah App. 1998); accord State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 105859 (Utah App. 1992) (observations of contraband in "plain sight made from a place where
a police officer has a right to be do not amount to a search in the constitutional sense")
(citation omitted).
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traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a
private dwelling." James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 (citations omitted). "Although a person has a
lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection
of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 8,
17 P.3d 1135 (quoting Schlosser, 114 P.2d at 1135 (citation omitted). Notwithstanding the
existence of this diminished protection, "[t]he Fourth Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee
against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures."
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,681(1985). "The touchstone of [an] analysis under
the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
government invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106,108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19 (1968)). There is "no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967).
New York v. Class supports the State's argument that Deputy Castleberry's intrusion
into defendant's limited protected space was too minor to require suppression of evidence.
In Class, the investigating officer legitimately stopped the defendant's car for speeding.
Class, 475 U.S. at 108,106 S. Ct. at 962-63.6 The officer then opened the car door to look

6

Although Larocco is factually somewhat similar to Class, the Utah Supreme
Court's opinion is inapposite to the analysis applied under Class in this case. Larocco
was decided under only the Utah State Constitution. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465.
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for the vehicle identification number (VIN), required by federal law to be displayed on the
doorjamb and in plain view beneath the windshield. Id. at 108, 112, 106 S. Ct. at 962-65.
Because the VIN on the dashboard was covered by papers, the officer moved them. While
doing so, he saw the handle of a gun beneath the driver's seat and promptly arrested the
defendant. Id. at 108, 106 S. Ct. at 963.
Recognizing that the officer's entry into the car constituted a "search," see id. at 115,
106 S. Ct. at 966, the court in Class applied a balancing test to determine whether the search
was "unreasonable." Id. 116, 106 S. Ct. at 967. The court first noted that the VIN serves
important safety and regulatory interests and that police officers had a right to demand access
to it. Id. at 114-15, 106 S. Ct. at 966 ("[W]e have no difficulty in concluding that a demand
in inspect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration papers, is within the scope
of police authority pursuant to a traffic stop."). The court concluded its analysis, stating:
[Balancing [the] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion," . . . the intrusion in this case was
permissible. . . . [T]he governmental interest in highway safety served by
obtaining the VIN is of the first order, and the particular method of obtaining
the VIN here was justified by a concern for the officer's safety. The search was
focused in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that
objective,... [i.e.,] little more intrusive than a demand that respondent - under
the eyes of the officers - move the papers himself.... The officer here checked
both [locations where the VIN was required to be displayed], and only those
two locations. The officer did not root about the interior of respondent's
automobile before proceeding to examine the VIN... When he did intrude, the

Defendant in this case claims protection only under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 7.
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officer simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the VIN was
located to move the offending papers.
Id. at 118-19,106 S. Ct. at 968 (citations omitted).
Similarly in this case, a motorist is required to have an operator's license. Utah Code
Ann. § 53-3-202 (l)(a) (1998) ("A person may not drive a motor vehicle on a highway in this
state unless the person is granted the privilege to operate a motor vehicle by being licensed
as a driver by the division under this chapter."). Also, it is well established that "an officer
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration,
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah
1994).
Most importantly, the record does not suggest that, in reaching into the car to retrieve
defendant's purse himself, Deputy Castleberry acted out of any other motive than to safely
obtain defendant's identification. Unlike the officer in Schlosser, there is no evidence that
the deputy "scanned" the interior of the car. Indeed, Schlosser distinguished the legitimacy
of an officer's single-minded intention to "solely [] identify the driver, a clearly legitimate
purpose." Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1136 n.4 (citing State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888,
891(Minn. 1988), and Class, 475 U.S. at 118-19, 106 S. Ct. at 968-69). The deputy's
testimony suggests that he saw the bindle only because it was in plain view (R. 102:18-20,
36). Further, the undisputed testimony indicates that the only reason Deputy Castleberry
refused defendant's offer to retrieve her purse was that he did not want anyone's movements
to disturb his control of the situation (R. 102:18,35). In sum, any intrusion by the deputy into
17

the passenger compartment of defendant's car was for a legitimate purpose and was minimal.
On balance, therefore, this Court should conclude that the deputy's "search" was not
unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?-/

day of September, 2001.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

?

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Defendant, Angie M. Brake, filed her Motion to Suppress on July 5,2000. A
suppression hearing was conducted on August 7,2000. Defendant was present and was
represented by Mr. Paul Dewitt, Esq. Mr. David Clark, Deputy Utah County Attorney,
represented the State of Utah.
The matter was taken under advisement and the State of Utah was given time tofilea
memorandum. The Statefiledits Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress on August IS, 2000.
The Court, having considered the testimony at the hearing, arguments of counsel, and
legal memoranda, nowfindsand rules as follows:
1.

On January 29,2000, Deputy Castleberry of the Utah County Sheriff's Office was

on patrol alone in an isolated area of Utah County on a road which goes along Utah Lake by the
Lindon Boat Harbor and which is directly west of the Geneva Steel Plant.
2.

Officer Castleberry testified that this is an area that "has been known to frequent

criminal activity." Transcript at page 33.
3.

It was a dark, cold winter night at approximately 11:45 p.m. when Officer

Castleberry spotted two vehicles off the road. Officer Castleberry stopped to investigate and "to
determine whether or not they needed assistance..." Transcript at page 15. One vehicle was a
white pickup truck and the other was a Nissan passenger vehicle.

4.

He noted that both vehicles appeared to have occupants. The pickup truck was

running and he thought the Nissan vehicle was probably running.
5.

The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle

impossible. Castleberry at 16 (15-20).
6.

Afifteen-year-oldgirl was in the driver's seat of the vehicle while defendant was

sitting in the rear seat with another passenger who had difficulty in understanding or
communicating in English. Castleberry at 17(1-15).
7.

Because it was past curfew, and a juvenile was present who was not licensed to

drive the vehicle, Deputy Castleberry sought identification from defendant who claimed to be the
owner of the vehicle. Castleberry at 17 (20).
8.

Deputy Castleberry testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the

curfew violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's
time to be headed for home." But during the conversation he then learned that all the occupants
were from San Pete County. He wanted further to check to see if anyone was licensed to drive
the vehicle. Castleberry at 37(16-18).
9.

After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castleberry then

opened the rear door on the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with defendant because he was
unable to see her through the window orfromhis vantage at the driver's open window.
10.

Officer Castleberry asked defendant for identification. Defendant indicated or

pointed to a purse in thefrontpassenger seat. Officer Castleberry testified that he decided to
retrieve the license because it was located in a dark area over which he had no control.
Castleberry at 17(6-7).
11.

Officer Castleberry, for safety reasons, then retrieved the purse himself. "I

opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I believed to be her purse... As I reached for the
purse, I noticed a small white bindle containing a white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the
purse on the front seat." The bindle was in plain view on the passenger seat between the purse
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and the console. The purse on thefrontseat did not belong to the defendant. While her driver's
license was ultimately obtained, it was not obtainedfromthe purse on thefrontseat. Castlebeny
at 18 (18-22).
12.

Defendant's purse, containing her license, was located later by Officer Castlebeny

in thefrontpassenger area of the vehicle. He could not recall whether it was in the glove
compartment or the floor area, but was not on thefrontseat.
13.

Subsequent to entering the vehicle,findingthe evidence, and seizing the drugs,

Deputy Castlebeny spoke with defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found. That questioning
was conducted without giving defendant her Miranda warnings. Castlebeny at 42 (9-11).
14.

Deputy Castlebeny questioned defendant afterfindingthe illegal drugs. He

further testified that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs; (2) that person
would be defendant if no one else claimed the drugs; and (3) that defendant was not free to leave
during questioning. Castlebeny at 41 (11-25) - 42 (1-8).
15.

Specifically, during the questioning of defendant, Miss Brake asked the deputy

what was going to happen. Deputy Castlebeny told her, UI said, if I cannot determine who owns
the cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for
what is inside your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came forth
and claimed possession of it" Castlebeny at 20 (21-25) - 21 (1-5).
16.

Officer Castlebeny had called for backup and Officer Chipman arrived. He

conducted a further search of the Nissan as Officer Castlebeny continued his investigation and
questioning of the occupants of both vehicles.
17.

Officer Chipman located, in plain view, a tin canister that had a straw in it and a

razor blade. These items were located uup against the back window" of the Nissan near where
the defendant was sitting.

-3-

n.
ISSUES
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence in this case because the search of the subject
vehicle was conducted without a warrant and because statements by the defendant to Officer
Castleberry were made without a Miranda warning.
ISSUE NO. 1
Was Sgt Castleberry's warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, which took
place when the officer opened the front passenger door of the defendant's vehicle,
permissible and justified?
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exception
to the warrant requirement to substantiate a search. State v. Arrov. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
State v. Shoulderblade- 905 P. 2d 289 (Utah, 1995). The State of Utah relies upon a Washington
Court of Appeals case, State v. Grinier. 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983), which stands for the
proposition that "if circumstances either place the police in danger or create ariskof loss or
destruction of evidence, a warrantless search is permissible." Id. at 552 (Emphasis added.) If this
is a paramount rule of law, one would certainly think there would be a case out of this
jurisdiction, and some case other than a Washington intermediate court of appeals to announce it.
This Court has carefully reviewed the testimony regarding Deputy Castleberry's
decision to retrieve defendants driver's license as contained in direct examination (Transcript,
page 17, line 10 - 25; page 18, line 1 - 22) and cross examination (Transcript, page 33, lines 1425, and page 34, page 35, page 36, lines 1 - 25). Copies are attached.
Officer Castleberry testified that he intended to retrieve the purse out of a sense of
personal safety and to inspect the purse/area for weapons. Did he have sufficient justification to
be concerned? These are the "officer safety" facts:
1.

He was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup.
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2.

It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in Utah

3.

The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer Castleberry

County.

described it as a "deserted road."
4.

There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each, (three occupants in

the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked contiguous.)
5.

This was an area offrequentcriminal activity.

6.

His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact that all of

the windows were fogged up.
7.

The other vehicle was running and Officer Castleberry testified he believed the

subject vehicle had the engine on with afifteen-year-oldunlicensed girl behind the wheel and two
other passengers in the back seat.
Ultimately would it have been permissible for Officer Castleberry to shine a flashlight
through the passenger window for safety purposes? Yes. Then, since the window was fogged
and severely restricted his vision, was he then justified to open the door? It is the opinion of the
Court that under these circumstances the Officer was justified in opening the passenger door.
When he did so the bindle of drugs was in plain view. Inevitably the drugs may have been
discovered even if the defendant had retrieved the purse because the purse did not belong to her
and presumably did not contain ho* license.
The Mirquet ruling clarified factors to be considered by a Court in assessing whether a
defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda.
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes is well settled. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspect'sfreedomof action is curtailed to a
degree associated with formal arrest. More specifically, Miranda warnings are
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they
exert upon the detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
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exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned
of his constitutional rights.
The "not free to leave" standard, on the other hand, determines whether
a person has been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. That standard is broader than the Miranda standard. A person
mav be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for
Fifth Amendment purposes. Whether one is "in custody" for Miranda
purposes depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather
than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the
examination.
In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers,
even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to
leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. That is true even though an
officer engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during
the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a subjective,
unstated intent to arrest the driver...
To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest, Salt Lake Citv v. Carnen 664 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1983), set out four factors to be evaluated: 1) the site of the
interrogation; 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of the
interrogation"...
In holding that Mirquet was in custody, the Court of Appeals, applying
the Carner factors, found that 1) the site of the interrogation was inside the
police car; 2) Officer Mangelson's investigation focused solely on defendant;
3) the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4) the form of the interrogation
evidenced a clear coercive intent on the part of the officer to prompt Mirquet
to produce incriminating contraband; and 5) the place of the interrogation
added to the coercive environment.
The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate
conclusion that the defendant was "in custody." Id at 1146,47 & 48.
(Emphasis added).
ISSUE NO. 2
At what point was the defendant in custody and the subject of an interrogation so
as to require the officer to administer Miranda warnings to the defendant?
-6-
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Both sides rely upon the case of State v. Mirouet 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1996). This
Court must apply the law contained in Mirquet to the facts of this case. The scenario of facts
presented by the State of Utah in its briefing seems to rely upon the officer's report, which is not
in evidence. The Court must rely upon the testimony at the hearing.
Likewise, the defendant relies upon "facts" that are not in evidence, such as "the
defendant was not experienced or knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure and the defendant
had never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal record." These facts are not in
evidence. Defense argues that Ms. Brake's "inexperience with the criminal justice system"
together with other circumstances mandate that the Miranda warning should have been prior to
interrogation.
Defendant further argues that a reasonable person in Miss Brake's shoes (knowledge,
experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject of a custodial
interrogation by Deputy Castleberry. While that might be a correct statement of the law, there is
absolutely no testimony or evidence in the case respecting Ms. Brake's knowledge, experience
and understanding or her "inexperience with the criminal justice system." She did not testify at
the hearing and certainly there is no evidence that Deputy Castleberry knew about or inquired
about her past criminal history, past drug use or her knowledge of the criminal justice system or
legal procedure. That would not have been permissible.
In the case at bar, Officer Castleberry observed a white plastic bindle on the passenger
sidefrontseat immediately after he opened thefrontdoor. He picked it up and asked who owned
it, to which no one responded. The bindle was next to a purse. When the officer asked who
owned the purse, the defendant, Ms. Brake or others, responded that the purse belonged to a
young woman in the second vehicle, the white truck. While Castleberry was speaking with this
young woman, a backup officer, Deputy Chipman, arrived and Castleberry directed him to search
the defendant's vehicle. As Officer Chipman was searching the defendant's vehicle, Castleberry
spoke with several individuals including the defendant, Ms. Brake. He checked for signs of

-7-

cocaine use in various individuals and testified: "It appeared to me that all of the individuals that I
looked at exhibited signs of having used cocaine."
No one was "free to leave" while the officer asked questions. Applying the
Mirquet/Carner test the Court finds:
1.

The questioning took place at the remote site in Officer Castleberry's patrol

2.

The investigation focused on all of the individuals in the two vehicles;

3.

There was no objective indicia of arrest; no handcuffing, no one being constrained

vehicle;

in a vehicle; no formal "you are under arrest" directive. In addition, there was nothing said which
attempted to coerce her or prompt her to retrieve incriminating evidence.
4.

The investigation was quite short and there was no coercive or accusatory

statements.
Accordingly, applying the four-pronged test, the Court does not find that Ms. Brake had
been "deprived of her freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda warnings. But
once she had admitted "the specific bindle was hers in addition to any cocaine that - the residue
that was found within the box..." the Miranda was implicated. It was not given at that stage and
should have been.
RULING
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. Counsel for the
State of Utah is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to calendar this case in order to set a jury trial.
Dated this / '

day of October, 2000.
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